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Abstract: This essay partakes in the dialogue between history, anthropology, and social 
theory on the topic of debt as a social relation. Drawing on sources from nineteenth-
century Switzerland, it examines everyday routines of debt collection in liberalism by 
taking the seized collateral object to the center of historical analysis. It is shown how the 
attached goods in a debtor’s household became an object of knowledge for nineteenth-
century framers of law as well as for ordinary debtors. I make use of anthropological 
theory in order to describe the legal techniques of delineating and extracting collateral, 
and I show how these legal techniques implied specific knowledge practices. I then look 
at two borderline cases of collateralization: the pawning of mobile goods and the 
imprisonment of insolvent debtors. Further I discuss how, by the 1880s, the limits of debt 
collection were discussed, when certain goods were exempt for seizure in a projected 
federal law. Overall, on an epistemological level, debt collection appears as a double 
movement: it provided basic tools to untangle property relationships, yet all the while it 
created new, unpredictable complications. Thus debt collection was a distinctive arena in 
which the uneasy conceptual relationship between people and things in nineteenth-
century liberalism unfolded. From this conceptual node I propose a historical 
epistemology of the collateral object. 
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In truth societies are not simply problem-solving mechanisms: they are also problem-
creating mechanisms. 
Marilyn Strathern, The Gender of the Gift, 33. 
An Introduction to the Problem 
This essay deals with reflections about the objectification of relationships and the 
volatility of things in nineteenth-century liberalism by looking at the routine collection of 
debts. In particular, I examine the methods of collateralization and focus on the role of 
movable collateral in the relationship between borrowers and lenders. This approach 
highlights an otherwise inconspicuous object within the debt relationship, that is, the 
collateral itself. Shifting the collateral object into the center of historical analysis, offers 
new perspectives on the history of debt and, more generally, additional insight into the 
complicated relationship between personhood and things in nineteenth-century everyday 
life. For the object meant to provide a guarantee—the good that is used as collateral— in 
its materiality encapsulates social relations. The characteristics of collateralization 
become urgent in cases of debt collection in which objects are legally seized. This essay 
thus appraises the seizure of property in debt enforcement in the context of other forms of 
collateralization like the pawning of objects. I turn to anthropological theory to better 
understand the ways in which collateral objects were assessed, fenced in, and 
transferred—in other words, how this unremarkable thing became an object of 
knowledge. Thus I venture the argument that the methods of collateralization provided a 
basic legal technique that stabilized the relationality of debt in nineteenth-century 
liberalism, yet by the same token these methods introduced new irreconcilable irritations. 
The approach proposed here provides new insights into the culture of borrowing and 
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lending and ultimately, into the everyday workings of liberalism.1 I will map out my 
understanding of liberalism as the argument unfolds, but for the moment, let me propose 
an initial definition of liberalism as a “rule at a distance” intended to create self-
regulating circuits of goods, people, and information.2 Liberalism was further, and 
essentially, linked to the rule of law, to principles of due process, and to a distinct 
valorization of private property. And liberalism was, finally, acutely preoccupied with the 
relation between subject and object, between personhood and things. In Switzerland – a 
country that was viewed as a laboratory of economic and political liberalism and the case 
study that provides the sources for this essay – liberalism’s legal techniques of debt 
collection were based on customary routines; a law of practices, so to speak.3 
 
Focusing on collateralization, it is possible to provide specific historical answers 
to broad questions: it helps to better understand the inner life of nineteenth-century 
liberalism by examining the everyday efforts of historical actors to mobilize things, to 
keep the categories of “things” and “persons” separated, and to tirelessly fabricate a 
circumscribed realm for things as things. Law played a constitutive role in “dividing up 
inchoate substance into discernible chunks of stuff,” as has recently been argued in a 
suggestive article on the materiality of law. In what follows, I examine these mundane 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is in part a response to the call for historical research based on the “unpaid” (l'impayé). Compare 
Claire Lemercier and Claire Zalc, “Pour une nouvelle approche de la relation de crédit en histoire 
contemporaine,” Annales: Histoire, sciences sociales 67, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 2012): 979–1009. 
2 Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London, 2003), 100. 
3 On the political culture of liberalism in nineteenth-century Switzerland, compare: Lerner, Laboratory of 
Liberty; Elisabeth Joris, Liberal und eigensinnig. Die Pädagogin Josephine Stadlin – die Homöopathin 
Emilie Paravicini-Blumer (Zurich, 2010); Oliver Zimmer, A Contested Nation: History, Memory, and 
Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761–1891 (Cambridge, 2003); Barbara Weinmann, Eine andere 
Bürgergesellschaft. Klassischer Republikanismus und Kommunalismus im Kanton Zurich im späten 18. und 
19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2002); and Gordon A. Craig, The Triumph of Liberalism: Zürich in the Golden 
Age, 1830–1869 (New York, 1988). 
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legal techniques with an eye on knowledge practices.4 The goal is to better understand 
how the experience of things shaped new concepts; or, in other words, to examine how 
thought occurred via things.5 Thus my argument expands on long-held interests in the 
historiography of lending and borrowing with its keen sense for material culture.6 For, as 
has been observed for early modern times and for the nineteenth century alike, the 
perceived creditworthiness of a person was a “fluctuating identity”, linked to personal 
appearance and demeanor in which immaterial and material dimensions overlapped.7 In 
credit dealings, objects were constantly an indicator of social significance and thus 
provided a point of orientation for the historical actors.8 The social fabric of credit had 
tangible aspects. Yet the three-way relationship between objects, their monetary value, 
and the personhood of the debtor was repeatedly contested. The use of goods as collateral 
thus illustrates the persistently difficult relationship between personhood and mobile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tom Johnson, “Medieval Law and Materiality: Shipwrecks, Finders, and Property on the Suffolk Coast, 
ca. 1380–1410,” American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (April 2015): 408 (quote). For approaches 
consonant with the following argument, see Alan Pottage, Martha Mundy, eds., Law, Anthropology and the 
Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things (Cambridge, 2004) and Timothy Mitchell, Rule of 
Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, 2002). 
5 Amira Henare, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell, “Introduction,” in Thinking through Things: 
Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically (London, 2007), 1–31: esp. 12-16. On such anthropologically 
informed perspectives in historical scholarship, see Delphine Gardey, Le linge du Palais-Bourbon: Corps, 
matérialité et genre du politique à l'ère démocratique (Lormont, 2015) and Jakob Tanner, Historische 
Anthropologie zur Einführung (Hamburg, 2004), chap. 6. In a different register, Rebecca Spang’s study 
impressively links multiple dimensions of money, both as a sign system and as material stuff. See her Stuff 
and Money in the Time of the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 2015). 
6 The most obvious area for this interest in material culture is the history of consumer credit. See, Jan 
Logemann, ed., The Development of Consumer Credit in Global Perspective: Business, Regulation, and 
Culture (New York, 2012); Sean O’Connell, Credit and Community: Working-Class Debt in the UK since 
1880 (Oxford, 2009); Beverly Lemire, The Business of Everyday Life: Gender, Practice and Social Politics 
in England, c. 1600-1900, (Manchester, 2005); Erika Rappaport, “ ‘A Husband and His Wife’s Dresses’: 
Consumer Credit and the Debtor Family in England, 1864-1914”, in Victoria De Grazia, ed., The Sex of 
Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective (Berkeley, CA, 1996), 163-187; James Carrier, 
Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700 (London, 1995). 
7 Margot Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge, 2003), 
quote on 21; Clare Haru Crowston, Credit, Fashion, Sex: Economies of Regard in Old Regime France 
(Durham, NC, 2013), 98. 
8 Laurence Fontaine, The Moral Economy: Poverty, Credit and Trust in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 
2014); Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relation in Early Modern 
England (Basingstoke, 1998). 
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objects. With respect to the history of nineteenth-century liberalism, this is an argument 
that stresses both continuities and specificity. For a uneasiness with the ability to move 
and fix objects can be traced to much earlier epochs and remains urgent for debt dealings 
in present-day capitalism.9 For example, medievalist Martha Howell points to the legal 
techniques in late-medieval commerce that drew a distinction between mobile and 
immobile goods and allowed for specific types of mobilization of each.10 Conversely, 
anthropologist Janet Roitman observes on foreclosed houses in the United States after 
2008 that no a priori value lying in a material object (a home) was being translated into 
house prices, but rather the reverse: processes of valuation lead to the expulsion of 
inhabitants and affected the materiality of the objects, turning houses into ruins.11 
And yet the story of nineteenth-century debt law also gives indication for 
historical specificity and changes when legal experts as well as ordinary creditors and 
debtors negotiated the status of human bodies, pocket watches, religious icons, or dung 
piles as collateral. Liberal nineteenth-century legal principles fostered a material 
conception of property that equated ownership with the total and perfect sovereignty over 
an object.12 And if the subject was formed by the possession of objects, as presupposed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I would like to thank an anonymous commentator on an earlier version of the essay who encouraged me 
to stress this crucial point more clearly. 
10 Martha Howell, Commerce before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600, (Cambridge, 2010), chap. 1. 
11 Janet Roitman, Anti-Crisis (Durham, NC, 2014), esp. 47–56, 77. See also Ute Tellmann, "Schulden – 
eine Kultursoziologie ökonomischer Dinge", in Joachim Fischer, ed., Kultursoziologie im 21. Jahrhundert 
(Wiesbaden, 2014), 159–170. 
12 Dieter Schwab, “Eigentum,” in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 
1975), 78; Robert Descimon, “Reading Tocqueville: Property and Aristocracy in Modern France,” in 
Robert Schneider, Robert M. Schwartz, eds., Tocqueville and Beyond: Essays on the Old Regime in Honor 
of David D. Bien (Newark, NJ, 2003), 111–126; Mikhail Xifaras, La propriété. Etude de philosophie du 
droit (Paris, 2004). 
	   6	  
the legal and cultural expectations of liberalism, persons and their things were 
intertwined, and the seizure of goods touched upon a sensible link.13  
I try to substantiate this argument in four steps. I first provide some context on the 
Swiss system of debt collection and on my approach to the question at hand. Then I 
outline how legal techniques of collateralization, despite their seeming simplicity, hid 
fundamental contradictions. Since such contradictions become especially apparent in 
borderline cases of collateralization, section three examines two such cases that were 
common, yet albeit precarious in the nineteenth century: the imprisonment of debtors, 
where the body served as collateral, and the pawning of goods. The discussion finally 
leads to certain limits on collateralization, limits that exempted some household goods 
from seizure – such limits, which were intended to protect the debtor, were discussed in 
relation to the federal law of 1892 in a moment when the subsistence level was an issue 
of widespread social debate. In the conclusion, I propose a historical epistemology of the 
collateral object by linking the changing ways of collateralization to different ways of 
knowing: compartementalized, investigative, liminal, or taxonomical forms of 
knowledge. 
 
Situating Collateral 
To delve into the specificities of collateral, nineteenth-century Switzerland is an 
apt case. In this early industrialized society debt collection remained based on received 
practices, until the latter were standardized in a federal law, the “federal statute on debt 
enforcement and bankruptcy” that was passed in 1889 and went into effect in 1892. There 
was much continuity between early modern systems and liberalism’s rule of law: the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property (Chicago, 1993), 35–71. 
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collection of debts relied on accessible, quotidian ways of legal procedure whose 
administrative barriers (the costs and efforts it required of creditors and debtors alike), 
however, were successively lowered throughout the nineteenth century. By century’s end, 
the federal law of 1892 established a fundamental difference between bankruptcy 
proceedings—which involved inventorying a debtor’s entire property and redistributing it 
among his creditors according to a fixed allocation formula—and attachment—in which 
property of the debtor was seized for each individual claim.14 Prior to the introduction of 
this federal law, many variations and combinations of these basic models of debt 
collection existed, and objects could be attached to force payment in a variety of ways.15 
Debt collection also touched upon the status of citizenship, which itself in turn underwent 
changes in the nineteenth century, for the bankruptcy of a male debtor resulted in the loss 
of his civil rights. This stripping on one’s honor was of great concern within a republican 
political system which—compared to the other European states—was based on an 
unprecedented level of male suffrage.16 While the social effects and cultural significance 
of bankruptcy proceedings have garnered significant attention from historians, I address 
the less conspicuous moment in which property was legally seized.17 After all, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Yves Le Roy, “Le choix des voies de poursuite à la fin du XIXe siècle, en particulier dans le projet 
de loi fédérale sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite du 23 février 1886,” in Le Droit commercial dans la 
société suisse du XIXe siècle, ed. Pio Caroni, (Fribourg, 1997), 250–303. 
15 The broad spectrum of methods of debt collection in Switzerland was met with great amazement 
(“étonnement”) by the Frenchman Edmond Thaller in his comparison of international bankruptcy laws: Des 
faillites en droit comparé, avec une étude sur le règlement des faillites en droit international, vol. 1 (Paris, 
1887), 97. 
16 Zimmer, Contested Nation, 122, esp. Fn. 13; however, on the limits of franchise see Albert Tanner, “Ein 
Staat nur für die Hablichen? Demokratie und politische Elite im frühen Bundesstaat”, in Brigitte Studer, 
ed., Etappen des Bundesstaates. Staats- und Nationsbildung der Schweiz, 1848–1998 (Zurich, 1998), 63–
88. 
17 See, among others, Dorothee Guggenheimer, Kredite, Krisen und Konkurse. Wirtschaftliches Scheitern 
in der Stadt St. Gallen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Zurich, 2014); Thomas Max Safley, ed., The History of 
Bankruptcy: Economic, Social and Cultural Implications in Early Modern Europe (New York, 2013); Ingo 
Köhler and Roman Rossfeld, eds., Pleitiers und Bankrotteure. Zur Geschichte wirtschaftlichen Scheiterns, 
(Frankfurt, 2012); Erika Vause, “‘He Who Rushes to Riches Will Not Be Innocent’: Commercial Values 
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contemporary expert estimated that 75 to 80 percent of all cases of debt collection in 
Switzerland involved the seizure of collateral objects, handled by low-level officials, 
rather than bankruptcy proceedings (they had, however, the same effect on the debtor’s 
civil rights if he was completely stripped of all his assets).18 These seizures were 
inconspicuous and simple: the value of the seized goods was only roughly estimated 
because the latter were only temporarily attached (in most cases, the debtor paid before 
the goods were liquidated), and, in case of liquidation, in most instances were subject to 
an auction. It is therefore important to emphasize the limited administrative costs of the 
legal system of debt collection in Switzerland in the nineteenth century. Attachment 
involved little state intervention: a system of deadlines and sanctions governed these 
administrative routines of summary justice almost independently, and judicial hearings 
were rarely necessary.19 Legal experts were certain that the various laws of debt 
enforcement had “grown on the soil of habit.”20 Debt collection by attachment was based 
on stable procedures since early modern times in which republican, communal forms of 
governance were imbricated with newly emerging forms of state expertise. In the course 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Commercial Failure in Postrevolutionary France,” French Historical Studies 35, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 
321–349; Julie Hardwick, “Banqueroute : la faillite, le crime et la transition vers le capitalisme dans la 
France moderne”, in Histoire, Economie & Société 30, no. 2 (2011): 79–93; Scott Sandage, Born Losers. A 
History of Failure in America (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure. 
Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001); Robert Beachy, 
“Bankruptcy and Social Death: The Influence of Credit-Based Commerce on Cultural and Political 
Values,” in Zeitsprünge. Forschungen zur Frühen Neuzeit 4, no. 4 (2000): 329–343; Toby L. Ditz, 
“Shipwrecked; or Masculinity Imperiled: Mercantile Representations of Failure and the Gendered Self in 
Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” Journal of American History 81, no. 1 (June 1994): 51–80. 
18 Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv (hereafter BAR) E 22 1000/134 2609, Johann Jakob Oberer to Federal 
Counselor Louis Ruchonnet, Liestal, June 2 1882. Oberer based his estimation on statistics for the cantons 
of Zurich, Schaffhausen, and Baselland. 
19 German legal scholars reported with admiration of this system which was organized to be much more 
“energetic and better for the common good” than that in Germany. Quote from Fr. Wyß, 
“Schuldbetreibung,” in Johann Caspar Bluntschli, ed., Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, vol. 9 
(Stuttgart/Leipzig 1865): 258–264, 264. 
20Alexander Reichel, “Referat: Das Betreibungsamt im schweizerischen Recht,” Zeitschrift für 
schweizerisches Recht 28 (1887): 567-607; Zur Volksabstimmung vom 17. November 1889. Ein Wort der 
Aufklärung an das Schweizervolk zum Bundesgesetze über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (Bern, 1889), 6. 
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of the nineteenth century, new supervising bodies assumed authority over these 
entrenched legal routines. The principles of due process and transparency of the state 
were tied to decentralized power and localized oversight. The systematization of received 
forms of procedure gave the ways of debt enforcement characteristics we might term 
“liberal”. Distant, mediated forms of power became more widespread, for instance, when 
during the first half of the century, insolvent debtors were less and less publicly 
proclaimed in Sunday church but rather by way of the newly installed official gazette.21 
With the reordering of government in many Swiss cantons by the 1830s procedures of 
debt collection were further systematized and made more accessible: deadlines were 
successively shortened, procedural fees were lowered, oversight of local level officials 
was tightened, bankruptcy statistics were made public. Above all, this system in the 
interest of the preservation of private property and credit was centered on objects. 
Delineating and transferring things in order to guarantee a creditor’s claim was done by 
way of compartementalized knowledge: instead of protracted negotiations, a thing simply 
stood in for the owed sum. The advantages were not lost on contemporary experts. For 
example, a German handbook on economic and legal government recommended the 
Swiss system of debt collection, noting that it was “much more rigorously and 
beneficially arranged” than its counterparts in most German lands.22  
Liberalism for sure is a multifaceted, contested term, yet in the context of the economic 
and legal routines with which this essay deals, the aspects that inform my use of the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I discuss this shift in more detail in Mischa Suter, "The Boundaries of Debt: Bankruptcy between Local 
Practices and Liberal Rule in Nienteenth-Century Switzerland", in Chia Yin Hsu, Thomas Luckett, Erika 
Vause (eds.), The Cultural History of Money and Credit: A Global Perspective (Lanham, MD 2016), 54–
55. 
22 Friedrich von Wyß, "Schuldbetreibung", in, Johann Caspar Bluntschli (ed.): Deutsches Staats-
Wörterbuch, vol. 9 (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1865), 264, n. 
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converge in their relationship to materiality. The political effects of objects’ arrangements 
thus present one possibility for a study of the practical workings of liberalism. Liberalism 
mobilized materials, as historians have shown with regards to urban surroundings: asphalt 
floors, glass display windows, systems of pipes, and postal routes facilitated solidity, 
transparency, smoothness, and efficiency.23 Under liberalism, authority was conveyed in 
large part via objects, but the very “thingness” of these objects repeatedly limited and 
thwarted liberal governance.24 Burst pipes, broken glass windows, brittle concrete, and 
lost mailings testified to the contingency of the concrete world. The structure of power in 
liberalism was facilitated by the definition, measure, appraisal, and transferal of objects. 
In the process of completing these everyday transactions, new imponderabilities 
constantly emerged. Thus examining which techniques were employed to seize, limit, and 
transfer property in such cases reveals a profound ambiguity within the social life of 
property in the nineteenth century, for in collateralization the fundamental relationality of 
debts became locked up in an object.25 On the one hand, collateralization, as it had been 
handled since early modern times, substantially simplified the process of debt collection. 
On the other hand, collateralization created unsolvable problems that demonstrate a blind 
spot in liberalism’s regime of truth. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Patrick Joyce, The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800 (Cambridge, 2013); 
Chris Otter, The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain, 1800–1910 (Chicago, 
2008); Chris Otter, “Making Liberalism Durable: Vision and Civility in the Late Victorian City,” Social 
History 27 (January 2002): 1–15. 
24 On the disruptive “thingness” of objects see Bill Brown, “Thing Theory”, Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 
(Autumn, 2001), quote on 4; Trentmann, Frank: “Materiality in the Future of History: Things, Practices, 
and Politics,” in Journal of British Studies 48, no. 2 (2009): 283–307. 
25 On the ambiguity of property in the nineteenth century see Jonathan Sperber, Property and Civil Society 
in South-Western Germany 1820–1914 (Oxford, 2005); Georg Fertig, Äcker, Wirte, Gaben. Ländlicher 
Bodenmarkt und liberale Eigentumsordnung im Westfalen des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 2007); Rebekka 
Habermas, Thieves in Court: The Making of the German Legal System in the Nineteenth-Century 
(Cambridge, forthcoming). 
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In order to dissect such blind spots certain research strands between history, 
anthropology, and science studies “symmetrize” the relationship between people and 
things by regarding material and symbolic dimensions in one analytical frame. Among 
historians such a program is most commonly associated with Bruno Latour’s plea for an 
“intrinsic logic” or “agency of things,”26 but in this case it is the anthropologists Marilyn 
Strathern and Annelise Riles who have provided the theoretical impulse.27 Personhood 
and things, according to Strathern and Riles, are mutually interdependent, they do not 
exist beyond their relation, but are created by the interactions of contrasting perspectives. 
This opens new possibilities for examining knowledge practices; for example, processes 
of estimation and worth measurement via which historical actors shaped economic 
variables like “value” or “commodity” by classifying certain things as “economic.”28 In 
the relationship between creditor and debtor, the collateral stands in as what Riles terms a 
“placeholder.” Collateral as a placeholder is a device that mediates a credit relationship. 
It temporarily stands in for the duration of the unmet debt. As an object, it brings the 
instability of the debt relationship to a halt. Viewed in temporal terms, the placeholder is 
an object of suspension. Collateral works as if the transaction had already taken place; “it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 To use the phrase coined by Bert de Munck. Bert de Munck, “Artisans, Products and Gifts: Rethinking 
the History of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe,” Past and Present 224 (August 2014): 39-74. 
27 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, transl. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA, 1994); Marilyn 
Strathern, The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia 
(Berkeley, 1988); Marilyn Strathern, Property, Substance, and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons 
and Things (London, 1999); Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global 
Financial Markets, (Chicago, 2011). For an overview of Strathern’s impact on debates in social theory, see 
Alice Street, Jacob Copeman, eds., “Social Theory after Strathern,” special issue Theory, Culture & Society 
31, nos. 2 and 3 (January 2014); Olivier Allard, Guillaume Calafat, Nathalie La Valle, eds., “Traduire et 
introduire: Calveiro – Smail – Strathern,” special issue Tracés: revue des sciences humaines, hors-série 14, 
no. 3 (2014).  
28From various perspectives on the practices of classification that qualified specific things as “economic” 
(not drawing on Strathern or Riles, in particular, however), see Jane Guyer, Marginal Gains. Monetary 
Transactions in Atlantic Africa, (Chicago, 2004); Daniel Vickers, “Errors Expected: The Culture of Credit 
in Rural New England, 1750–1800,” in Economic History Review 63, no. 4 (2010): 1032–1057; Alexandra 
Shepard, Accounting for Oneself: Worth, Status and the Social Order in Early Modern England (Oxford, 
2015). 
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forecloses the question of the moment for the near future,” Riles writes, “by creating a 
dummy solution subject to future reevaluation.”29 Fairly inconspicuous knowledge 
practices created the conditions under which this substitution could take place. Here 
comes into play what I would like to call a historical epistemology of the collateral 
object. As historian Ann Stoler has shown, historical epistemology has developed a much 
more “worldly” scholarly usage beyond that of a formal theory of scientific knowledge.30 
Accordingly, concepts and techniques that bring to the fore certain forms of knowledge 
have become evident in the most varied of contexts, not just in the scientific laboratory or 
the scholar’s library. “Value” is such a fundamental concept, to which “insolvency” is 
related.31 The process of posting collateral in a debtor-creditor relationship contained 
moments of appraisal and commensuration in which concrete particularities had to be 
transformed into interchangeable values.32 Different ways of knowing took shape in these 
procedures, as will be shown in the subsequent sections. Compartementalized, 
investigative, liminal, or taxonomical modalities of knowledge lent themselves to the 
different forms of assessing and transferring things in collateralization, as a look at the 
seizure of objects, the imprisonment of debtors, pawnbroking, and at the limits on seizure 
that protected a debtor makes clear. At the same time, “epistemological fears”—to adapt 
the fitting phrase used by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison—impinged on the practices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Annelise Riles, “Collateral Expertise: Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Markets”, Current 
Anthropology 51, no. 6 (December 2010): 803. 
30 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton, 2009), 42. See also, Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in 
the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago, 1998), 17. 
31 Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy. Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (Chicago, 2008). 
32 For a reflection on such processes of transformation in varied historical contexts see: John L. Comaroff 
and Jean Comaroff, “Currencies of Conversion,” chap. 4 in Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, The 
Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier (Chicago, 1997); Carl Wennerlind, “The Epistemology 
of Credit,” chap. 3 in Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620-1720, (Cambridge, 
MA, 2011). 
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used to determine, value, property, and insolvency.33 The seizure of the collateral object 
was in essence a sequestration of the social relationship in a thing and consequentially a 
controlling of this “epistemic anxiety.”34 Yet the methods of collateralization themselves 
simultaneously threatened to undermine the practice of debt enforcement at an epistemic 
level.  
 
Attaching Property, Fabricating Collateral 
To seize property in order to legally collect debts had something of a fundamental 
balance of power between two opponents, as contemporaries repeatedly observed. 
Debtors who hid their property to prevent its seizure competed with creditors who strove 
to attach the debtors’ most precious goods.35 In the words of the historian Jonathan 
Sperber, hiding assets from creditors was a “major nineteenth-century participant and 
spectator sport.”36 In this everyday shuffling of property back and forth, seizure of goods 
was an inconspicuous procedure. Whereas bankruptcy proceedings were often drawn out 
and required the compilation of a comprehensive inventory of a debtor’s property by a 
certified notary, the records associated with the attachment of a debtor’s assets were often 
rudimentary and compiled by lesser communal bailiffs. As a “placeholder” in the debt 
relationship, collateral made exact knowledge unnecessary. Instead of a careful 
evaluation of value, a number of things could simply be attached. These bailiffs did not 
need to know much. Since the things were only meant to be attached temporarily—and, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York, 2007), 48; I draw here especially on the 
usage of the concept in Stoler, Archival Grain. 
34 Stoler, Archival Grain; Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 49. 
35 A collection of such didactic satirical stories is included in Avons-nous payé nos dettes? (Lausanne, 
1875), 10f; on creditors’ “hunts” for the most valuable pieces of property, see, among others, R. Brunner, 
Der Gesetzesentwurf über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs. Vortrag gehalten im bernischen Verein für 
Handel und Industrie, Montag den 2. Mai 1887 (Berne, n.d.). 
36 Sperber, Property, 120. 
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in fact, often remained within the household of the debtor unless the creditor demanded 
their removal—it was not necessary to assign a monetary value to each individual item. 37 
The bailiff only appraised whether or not the total value of the attached goods equaled 
that of the outstanding debt. A few simple notes in a standardized, preprinted record book 
were sufficient in such cases. In that sense, collateralization created, as Annelise Riles 
calls it, “a set of routinized knowledge practices.”38  
 
This basic legal technique, however, which did not generally involve a judge, 
often encountered practical complications. Attachment worked within the structure of 
social obligations. Local authorities secretly strove to counter the danger of domino 
effects that could result from insolvency. In an effort to avoid the costs associated with 
having to provide for a bankrupt debtor from the communal alms, these local officials 
chronically drew out the proceedings. When, by the 1830s, liberal cantonal governments 
introduced new forms of justice and transparency, countless complaints concerning this 
neglect came to light.39 The local officials proved especially reticent when faced with the 
final auction of attached property. 
Beyond this reticence, however, the sheer materiality of objects created 
difficulties. As a petition from officials in Zurich shows, the impounding of animals was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Auszüge aus den obergerichtlichen Rechenschaftsberichten von den Jahren 1872 bis und mit 1885, 
hauptsächlich das Notariatswesen und die Gemeindeammänner betreffend, möglichst alphabetisch 
geordnet. Jedermann als Hülfs- und Nachschlagbuch dienend (Affoltern a.A., 1887), 31f. 
38 Riles, Collateral Knowledge, 21. 
39 In the canton of Zurich in the peak year of 1855 there were at least 3,000 complaints (from an estimated 
population of 258,000). Fünf und zwanzigster Rechenschaftsbericht des Obergerichts an den Großen Rath 
des Standes Zurich über das Jahr 1855 (Zurich, 1856), 34f.; Heiner Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, ed., 
Historische Statistik der Schweiz (Zurich, 1996), 94. 
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especially difficult.40 The overseeing authority in one case wrote, “it is easy to make a 
mistake concerning the true worth of a horse,” as another official had done when he 
recorded a horse—“brown, ca. eight years old”—as collateral for 300 francs, but which 
only brought seventy-two francs at auction.41 Furthermore, employment in rural 
industries necessitated borrowing and lending.42 Within the cottage industry system, raw 
materials and prefabricated pieces were put out and circulated, and it was sometimes not 
clear to whom they belonged at any particular moment of time.43 Local officials 
accordingly insisted that cloth, silk thread, and other raw materials should be excluded 
from the attached property of weavers, because otherwise their employers would be 
aggrieved.44 
Certain claims could stand in opposition to the demands of other creditors. This 
was especially true of wages and board paid in advance, as was the case, when factory 
owners who had advanced money to their workers reclaimed their prepayment vis à vis 
the demands of the workers’ grocery dealers or other creditors. Thus the garnishing of 
wages was complicated by the methods of payment and the intermittent nature of wage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Petition des Vorsteher der Gesellschaft der Gemeindeammänner des Bezirkes Zurich namens derselben, 
zum Rechtstriebgesetz, 3 Februar 1842, P 5.2, STAZH. 
41 “Regreßanspruch gegen einen Gemeindeammann wegen ungenügender Pfändung,” Zeitschrift für Kunde 
und Fortbildung der zürcherischen Rechtspflege 14 (1864): 5, 1. 
42 The broad spectrum of debt-induced ties to laborers has recently received great attention under the 
umbrella term “bondage.” For a labor historical perspective, see Gwyn Campbell and Alessandro Stanziani, 
eds., Debt and Slavery in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Worlds (London, 2013); Marcel van der Linden, 
Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History, chap. 2 (Leiden, 2008). 
43 The classic studies on the protoindustrial conditions of production in the canton of Zurich are Rudolf 
Braun’s, Industrialisation and Everyday Life, transl. Sarah Hanbury Tenison, (Cambridge, 1990); Rudolf 
Braun, Sozialer und kultureller Wandel in einem ländlichen Industriegebiet im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
(Erlenbach at Zurich, 1965); and Ulrich Pfister, Die Zürcher Fabriques: protoindustrielles Wachstum vom 
16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Zurich, 1992). 
44 Petition des Vorsteher der Gesellschaft der Gemeindeammänner des Bezirkes Zurich namens derselben, 
zum Rechtstriebgesetz, 3 February 1842, P 5.2, STAZH. 
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labor.45 Only with the normalization of regular monetary wages towards the end of the 
nineteenth century could the garnishing of future wages become widespread.46 
Before the federal law of 1892, attached property was dealt with in a variety of 
ways. In some Alpine regions there was no auction at all, but rather the seized property 
was simply turned over to the creditor in lieu of payment.47 Supporters of standardizing 
the legal process viewed this as a sign of economic backwardness.48 One pamphleteer 
called this direct exchange of attached items “a true scandal” and held that if attached 
property was not subjected to the price mechanism of an auction, a true assessment of its 
value was impossible: “How should a local official accurately estimate the value of 
attached materials, paintings, trinkets? He will easily guess too high, too low. And what 
should a merchant in Berne do with an old dinghy which is transferred to him somewhere 
on the banks of Lake Lucerne?”49 
Seizing someone’s property, as judicial officials concurred, was to place a wager in 
accordance with its monetary value. Experts also agreed, however, that the subjective 
value of property was higher than this exchange value in the substitution. This referred to 
the fact that an object always brought less at auction than it was considered to be worth in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Inwieweit kann der Arbeitslohn eines Fabrikarbeiters gepfändet werden: “Rekursentscheid vom 29. 
November 1855,” Zeitschrift für Kunde und Fortbildung der zürcherischen Rechtspflege 2 (1855): 247–
250. 
46 J. H. Gwalter, Das zürcherische Schuldbetreibungsgesetz vom 1. April 1851. Mit Erläuterungen unter 
vorzüglicher Berücksichtigung der gerichtlichen Praxis (Zurich, 1853), 39; Conrad Jenny: Die 
Lohnpfändung. Pfändungsbeschränkungen nach Art. 93 des schweizerischen Schuldbetreibungs- und 
Konkursgesetzes (Aarau, 1912), 25–41. 
47 Alfred Nägeli, Das germanische Selbstpfändungsrecht in seiner historischen Entwicklung mit besonderer 
Rücksicht auf die Schweiz (Zurich, 1876), 102–105. 
48 On the contemporary impressions of central Switzerland as economically backward after the foundation 
of the federal state in 1848, see Aram Mattioli, “Die Innerschweiz im frühen Bundesstaat – neue 
Sichtweisen auf eine wenig bekannte Gesellschaft,” in Alexandra Binnenkade and Aram Mattioli, eds., Die 
Innerschweiz im frühen Bundesstaat (1848–1874): Gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Annäherungen (Zurich, 
1999), 11–30. 
49 Zur Volksabstimmung, 8. Similar arguments are made in “Die Obstruktion gegen das schweizerische 
Schuldbetreibungsgesetz,” Der Gerichtssaal: Zeitschrift für schweizerische Civil- und Strafrechtspflege 5, 
no. 4 (9 January 1889): 9f. 
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practice.50 Commentators observed that a washing trough, sofa, or table made of pine 
auctioned off to the highest bidder brought in less than it was worth to the household of 
the debtor. This asymmetry in the disposability of things went along with the compulsory 
nature of attachment—even though officials emphasized that the seizure and sale was 
meant not to punish the debtor but rather to satisfy the creditor with money. The 
discrepancy between the legal assertion that the seizure of property was meant not as 
punishment but rather as compensation and the material, asymmetrical subjective utility 
of the respective goods on which the system of debt collection was based points to an 
internal contradiction of attachment. 
The mobilization of goods, intended to enable the “free flow” aimed for in a 
liberal economy, increased over the course of the nineteenth century as systems of debt 
collection changed. The legal conception of collateral was not uniform: an object that had 
been mortgaged based upon the assumption of future appreciation was different than a 
portable asset that could be carried to the pawnshop or seized in attachment. All these 
renderings of collateral, however, shared a conception of property as a thing, and in all 
such cases, the legal distinction between real property and movable assets was 
significant.51 In the case of a mortgage, transferable property was rooted in immovable 
things.52 Over the course of the nineteenth century, these deposits became increasingly 
liquid, for example when annuities that had once been “in perpetuity” were converted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Herbert Conrad, Die Pfändungsbeschränkungen zum Schutze des schwachen Schuldners: eine juristische 
und sozialpolitische Studie (Jena, 1906), 71. 
51 On the medieval transformations of this Roman law distinction see Howell, Commerce, chap. 1. 
52 On the different forms of mortgage which were typical for the rural credit market in Switzerland, see 
Markus Mattmüller, Agrargeschichte der Schweiz im Ancien Régime, vol. 2, Vorlesung im WS 1978/79 und 
SS 1979, (unpublished manuscript, Department of History, University of Basel, 1979), 365–378; Hermann 
Schulin, “Zur Entwicklung des Grundpfandrechts in der Schweiz”, in Helmut Coing, ed., Wissenschaft und 
Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19. Jahrhundert, vol. 3, Die rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung 
des Grundeigentums und Grundkredits (Frankfurt, 1976), 373–414. 
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into bonds that could be terminated.53 In Zurich this liquidation of “eternal pensions” 
occurred in 1853 in the context of an expanding financial sphere and new targets for 
investment that challenged the privileged position previously held by mortgaged credit.54 
One observer suggested in 1869 that previously 
“it had been left to the goodwill of the bond debtor, whether he paid the interest 
on time or not; if so, he received a nice tip and a sausage together with a generous 
drink as a token of gratitude; if not, he received the same as a matter of habit. This 
is no longer the case; the capital that is not absorbed by the railroad and other 
joint-stock industries is invested in government bonds with decent interest and 
maximum profits.”55 
The process of collateralization undermined the conceptual distinction between 
fixed and movable assets, for mortgages on “fixed property” could be converted into 
freely circulating securities. A judicial expert thus observed in the mid-nineteenth century 
that “the strange situation has emerged that the claims to mortgaged real estate are 
included among the movable assets of the creditors and among the real property of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “Gesetz über die Ablösung grundversicherter Forderungen überhaupt und über die Natur und 
Wiederauflösung der durch den Uebergang von Unterpfändern auf dritte Besitzer entstehenden 
Rechtsverhältnisse insbesondere” [1853], in Officielle Sammlung der seit Annahme der Verfassung vom 
Jahre 1831 erlassenen Gesetze, Beschlüsse und Verordnungen des Eidgenössischen Standes Zurich, vol. 9, 
(Zurich, 1853), 280–286. 
54 On the expansion of the financial sphere after mid-century, see Franz Ritzmann, Die Schweizer Banken: 
Geschichte - Theorie – Statistik (Berne, 1973); Joseph Jung, Alfred Escher (1819-1882): Der Aufbruch zur 
modernen Schweiz. Bd. 3: Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, Eidgenössisches Polytechnikum, Aussenpolitik 
(Zurich, 2006). The insitutionalization of credit, however, remained limited, as suggested by this older case 
study: Arthur Wolf, Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der Verschuldung des bäuerlichen Grundbesitzes im 
Kanton Zürich. Grundbesitzverteilung und Bodenverschuldung der Gemeinde Waltalingen bei Stammheim, 
Zürich 1912. 
55 Farner, Gottfried: Der Schuldbriefverkehr und das zürcherische Notariatswesen unter der Initiative 
(Zurich, 1869), 9. See Martin Schaffner, Die demokratische Bewegung der 1860er Jahre: Beschreibung 
und Erklärung der Zürcher Volksbewegung von 1867 (Basel, 1982), 189–191. 
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debtor.”56 Mortgages repeatedly led to confusion about the status of real, fixed property 
and movable things. 
What is more, collateralization not only fabricated abstraction and the 
transformation of specifics into generalized equivalents, but, even more, it shaped new 
particularities itself.57 The method of collateralization created its own tangibility. This 
can be illustrated in an example of mortgaged real property. In a period of economic 
crisis linked to the cotton shortage caused by to the American Civil war, a wave of 
unsettling arson cases swept through several Swiss cantons in early summer 1867. A 
newspaper in Zurich blamed the discrepancy between the plummeting value of the 
mortgaged real estate compared with the relatively high value for which they were 
insured. When a bubble in the real estate market collapsed in the 1860s, real estate prices 
had bottomed out and banks became extremely reluctant to lend. Insurance values, 
however, remained high, meaning that “the hard-pressed in their need” who wanted “to 
avoid going bankrupt” were driven to become Brandteufel (literally, “fire devils,” or 
firebugs).58 Whether via the attachment of household utensils, animals, and property 
titles, demands for credit, or even the ruination of a property, the process of posting 
collateral transformed these objects. For, as becomes most starkly apparent in the arson 
case, it was the status of the objects as collateral in processes of commensuration that 
affected the objects’ materiality. What is more, collateral also restructured interpersonal 
relations. In the course of the nineteenth century, new forms of economic exchange 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, “Kommentar zum Sachenrecht,” in Privatrechtliches Gesetzbuch für den 
Kanton Zurich. Mit Erläuterungen, 3rd ed., vol. 2, Sachenrecht, (Zurich, 1861), 11. 
57 For an analysis of this abstraction and particularity within a Marxian framework, see Miranda Joseph, 
Debt to Society: Accounting for Life under Capitalism, chap. 1 (Minneapolis, 2014). 
58 “Der Brandteufel im Kanton Zurich,” in Der Republikaner: Zürcher Intelligenzblatt, no. 134 (8 June 
1867): 1. 
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strengthened not only financial intermediaries, as is recounted in familiar historical 
narratives on the modernization of credit markets, but simultaneously also restructured 
the mediative potential of personal relationships. In this context, I would like to point out 
the practice of co-signing loans, a specific configuration of personhood and debt that 
collateralized social relationships themselves. By the 1880s, during a protracted 
economic crisis, edifying texts, novels, and social interventions warned with heightened 
urgency about the “dangers of co-signing” a surety.59 By that time, banks increasingly 
required a cosigner to provide an additional security for loans, and social commentators 
viewed this as a dangerous objectification of social relationships. The supposedly 
traditional form of intermediation in which persons intervened to guarantee loans gained 
new importance with the emergence of new financial institutions and in the context of a 
modern economic crisis. 
 
To preliminarily conclude the argument so far, it is possible to highlight the 
contradictory roles which collateralization played in legal and economic aspects of 
everyday life. On one hand, impounding property simplified debt collection. This 
straightforward administrative procedure made do with a short-cut heuristics. The 
collateral served as a “placeholder”, making complicated appraisal of property values 
unnecessary and leading to compartementalized knowledge. The social relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Alexander Isler, “Die Gefahren der Bürgschaft. Warnung vor ihrer Eingehung und Vorschläge zur 
Abhülfe,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Gemeinnützigkeit 26 (1887): 339–389; Eduard Thurneysen, Eine 
offene Wunde unsers Volkslebens: Ein Wort wider das Bürgschaftswesen in unserer Zeit (Zurich, 1888); 
Gottlieb Egli, “Die Bürgschaft,” Der Gerichtssaal: Zeitschrift für schweizerische Civil- und 
Strafrechtspflege 4, no. 14 (16 February 1887): 72f. A prominent example of a literary rendering of this 
problematic was Martin Salander, a late work of the national author Gottfried Keller. See Gottfried Keller, 
Sämtliche Werke. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Walter Morgenthaler et al, vol. 8, Martin Salander 
(Zurich, 2004 [1886]). On the 1880s crisis in Switzerland, in some respects a late follow-up to the Europe-
wide Gründerkrise, see Thomas Widmer, Die Schweiz in der Wachstumskrise der 1880er Jahre (Zurich, 
1992). 
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implicit in property was relegated to a thing. Collateralization thus provided a simple 
legal infrastructure for credit transactions. On the other hand, collateralization also 
created new social ties. To frame an object as collateral did not reduce the intricacies of 
the social context but rather intensified these. In this sense, the methods of 
collateralization were prone to irritations: in the interest of enforcing contracts and 
regulating property relationships, collateralization complicated the relationship between 
creditors and debtors, and between the categories of persons and things. Borderline cases 
of collateralization shed light on this twofold effect between entanglement and 
disentanglement.60 The following section addresses two such particularly striking 
examples in the nineteenth century: pawning and the incarceration of debtors in which 
the body served as collateral. 
 
Borderline Cases: Pawnbroking and Incarceration of Debtors 
Pawnbroking was a marginal phenomenon in Switzerland, but it opens an 
exemplary vista on the relationship that linked personhood and objects in the nineteenth-
century imaginary.61 Long-term historical studies of pawnbroking in Europe have shown 
how civil and ecclesiastical authorities and, later, agencies of the bourgeois civil society 
assumed control of the system of pawnbroking in order to limit it.62 In Switzerland the 
“question of pawnbroking” was dealt with by philanthropic organizations, especially the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 To take up a terminology coined by Michel Callon. See idem, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of 
Economic Markets in Economics", in idem, ed., The Laws of the Markets (Oxford, 1998), 1–57. 
61 This was especially true when compared with England. For stories of pawnbroking in the nineteenth 
century, see Melanie Tebutt, Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit (Leicester, 
1983); Wendy A. Woloson, In Hock: Pawning in America from Independence through the Great 
Depression (Chicago, 2009); Karl Christian Führer, “Pawning in German Working-Class Life before the 
First World War,” in International Review of Social History 46, no. 1 (April 2001), 29–44; Paul Johnson, 
Saving and Spending: The Working-Class Economy in Britain, 1870–1939 (Oxford, 1985); Finn, Character 
of Credit, 76–89. 
62 On the ecclesiastical institution, the montes pietatis, see Fontaine, Moral Economy, chap. 6. 
	   22	  
private and predominantly Protestant Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft. Bourgeois 
philanthropists hoped to promote virtues of diligence and abstention by institutionalizing 
savings; pawnbroking was morally precarious in their eyes.63 These middle-class 
observers of the working-class everyday economy viewed pawnbroking as an 
“alchemical endeavor,” in which personal objects were converted into their monetary 
values.64 The nexus of material deposits and liquid cash struck the philanthropists 
simultaneously as a relic of a bygone age and a phenomenon of urban hypermodernity. 
One philanthropist viewed pawnbroking as “an institution of the Middle Ages, which in 
some regards strangely extends into our own, fundamentally different era.”65 In the 
nineteenth century, according to this commentator, pawnbroking was obsolete, for capital 
had become “more liquid” and was accessible to those “less well off.” At the same time, 
however, the anonymity of the “large cosmopolitan metropolis,” in which the poor and 
the rich were largely separated, necessitated pawnbroking, this philanthropist opined. He 
referred to the example of Paris, where supposedly, at the end of each summer, “twenty 
thousand parasols” found their way into pawnshops and twenty-eight million francs were 
thus “shut up in the pawnshop as though dead.”66 In the eyes of bourgeois commentators, 
pawnshops served as “institutions for the support of squandering” because the practice of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 At the beginning of the century, the Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft was quite successful in its primary 
effort to found local savings banks: by 1860, every fourth resident of the canton of Zurich had a savings 
account pass book. On the growth and ideology of the savings banks in nineteenth-century Switzerland, see 
Mischa Suter, “Ökonomischer Individualismus und moralischer Paternalismus. Sparkassen im Kanton 
Zurich während der Zeit des Pauperismus (um 1820–1860),” in Thomas David, et al, eds., Die Produktion 
von Ungleichheiten – La production des inégalités (Zurich, 2010), 133–144; Ritzmann, Schweizer Banken, 
23–36. See also Beatrice Schumacher et al., Freiwillig verpflichtet: Gemeinnütziges Denken und Handeln 
in der Schweiz seit 1800 (Zurich, 2010). 
64 W. Schmidlin, “Ueber Pfand- und Leihhäuser (monts de Piété): Referat in der Versammlung der 
Schweizerischen gemeinnützigen Gesellschaft zu Basel den 22. September 1864,” Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift für Gemeinnützigkeit 4 (1865): 67. 
65 J. L. Spyri, “Ueber Pfand- und Leihhäuser,” in Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Gemeinnützigkeit 3 (1864): 
235–253. 
66 Spyri, “Ueber Pfand- und Leihhäuser,” 235. 
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pawning threatened to obscure the limits between subjective needs and objective means.67 
From this perspective, pawnbroking was a liminal practice, strangely located between 
medieval “alchemical” exchanges and an anonymous, metropolitan modernity. According 
to this view, pawnbroking packed objects away as dead capital and animated quixotic 
desires. 
Although pawnbroking was criticized as an antiquated mechanism, the pledged 
objects were often decidedly modern, as is perhaps epitomized in the pocket watch, a 
liberal object par excellence.68 Pocket watches were initially a moderate luxury object, 
but the prices sank starting in the 1870s and they soon became affordable objects which 
could also be easily liquefied.69 Timepieces and jewelry of silver and gold made up 
nearly half the objects pawned in the city of Basel at the end of the nineteenth century.70 
For gold and silver jewelry, pawnbrokers gave loans for up to 80 percent of the material 
value; other objects could be pawned for approximately two-thirds of their market 
value.71 Priority was given to personal effects with clear delineation of personal property, 
which did not affect the interwoven relationship of protoindustrial production. The 
founders of such an establishment in Basel emphasized that they would not accept silk or 
other raw materials for fabrication as collateral.72  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Spyri, “Ueber Pfand- und Leihhäuser,” 245.My turn of phrase is indebted to Simmons, “Minimal 
Frenchmen: Science and Standard of Living, 1840–1960” (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 2004), 448. 
68 Chris Otter, “Making Liberal Objects: British Techno-Social Relations 1800–1900,” Cultural Studies 21, 
nos. 4–5 (June 2007): 570–590, esp. 577. 
69 Here and subsequently, Messerli, Gleichmässig, 149–151. 
70 Berichte der Basler Pfandleih-Anstalt 1884/85–1904/05, H + I D 601, SWA. 
71 “Reglement für die Mobiliarleihkasse der Zürcher Kantonalbank (vom 30. Weinmonat 1871),” 
inOffizielle Sammlung der seit 10. März 1831 erlassenen Gesetze, Beschlüsse und Verordnungen des 
Eidgenössischen Standes Zurich, vol. 15 (Zurich, 1873), 552, § 10; Bericht der Basler Pfandleih-Anstalt 
über die erste Geschäftsperiode vom 15. Januar 1884 bis 30. Juni 1885, genehmigt durch die 
Actionärsversammlung am 11. November 1885, Basel 1885, H + I D 601, Schweizerisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv Basel (hereafter SWA), 6. 
72 Über die Gründung einer Mobiliar-Leihkasse in Basel, in Verbindung mit einer Handwerker-Bank 
(Basel, 1864), 17. 
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Proponents of the pawning system—in Basel these came from among the ranks of 
lower craftsmen—emphasized that pawnbroking made the movable goods of a household 
productive. If the income of a household was insufficient, then this “minor capital tied up 
in the movable property” provided the only access to credit.73 This also benefited those 
business owners who had opened accounts for these families.74 Pawnbroking was thus 
seen to stabilize the relationship of exchange beyond the limits of the working class. On 
the other end of the spectrum, bourgeois philanthropists employed the rhetoric about 
discipline and frugality.75 However, the suggestion that pawnbroking should be a type of 
“alchemy” goes further: it points to the particularity and the liquidation of objects. In the 
eyes of the bourgeois philanthropists, these objects were meant for the individual’s use 
alone. From this perspective, the shift of intimate objects from the register of private 
property to the provider of a financial guarantee represented an impermissible 
misappropriation. The pawnshop made the contradiction between the particularity of the 
object and its exchange value clear. It fed the anxiety of middle-class commentators that 
objects to which one had an intimate relationship could be exchanged for anonymous 
currency.76 The corresponding values did not lend themselves to abstraction, they did not 
disappear, but remained material and visible in the objects stored in the pawn shop. This 
made the phenomenon difficult to classify; it appeared as liminal relations that seemed to 
embody simultaneously medieval backwardness and urban, modern anonymity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Mont de Piété in Basel, 20. 
74 Mont de Piété in Basel, 15. 
75 For expressions of concern about the control of consumption, see Woloson, In Hock, 112. 
76 Peter Stallybrass, “Marx’ Coat,” in Patricia Spyer, ed., Border Fetishisms: Material Objects in Unstable 
Spaces (New York, 1998), 196. 
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A parallel, if somewhat different problematic of exchangeability and materiality 
can be found in the incarceration of debtors. The attachment of persons in debtors’ prison 
created a conundrum in which the problem of offsetting bodies and values, the 
objectification of the person and the freedom of property, became especially apparent. 
Debtors’ prisons preoccupied the political imaginary in a variety of national contexts:77 
countless commentators have denounced the nexus of monetary value and persons, of 
private and public rights, as atavism in need of civilization.78 Comparative historical 
studies show that detention of the debtors’ bodies was most common where the seizure of 
their property was legally complicated, as was the case, for example, in England.79 For 
the French case, historian Erika Vause has shown how incarceration served as an 
intermittent method of coming to terms with the mobile, mercantile economy.80 In 
countries where it was relatively easy to attach property, like in Switzerland, such arrests 
were of marginal importance. Also, the denunciatory rhetoric surrounding debtors’ 
prisons was basically absent in Switzerland. Although imprisonment for debt was 
addressed only offhandedly in Switzerland, elements of a rhetoric of progress were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 I borrow the term “political imaginary” from Susanne Lüdemann, Metaphern der Gesellschaft: Studien 
zum soziologischen und politischen Imaginären (Munich, 2004), in her interpretation of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA, 1987). 
78 On the role of ritual in debtors’ prisons, see Gustav Peebles, “Washing Away the Sins of Debt: The 
Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the Debtors’ Prison,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 55, 
no. 3 (July 2013): 701–724; Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American 
Independence, esp. chap. 5, (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Sergei Antonov, “Law and the Culture of Debt in 
Moscow on the Eve of the Great Reforms, 1850-1870,” esp. chap. 5 (PhD diss., Columbia University, 
2011). 
79 V. Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and Company Winding-Up in 
Nineteenth-Century England (Oxford, 1995), 89; Amanda Bailey, Of Bondage: Debt, Property, and 
Personhood in Early Modern England, (Philadelphia, 2013), 7; Thomas M. Luckett, “Credit and 
Commercial Society in France, 1740–1789” (PhD diss., Princeton, 1992), 105. Luckett references Paul 
Hess Haagen, “Imprisonment for Debt in England and Wales,” (PhD diss., Princeton, 1986), 1, 28-30; 
Christoph Bergfeld, “Über die Aufhebung der Schuldhaft in Frankreich und in Deutschland,” in Jean-
François Kervégan, ed., Wechselseitige Beeinflussungen und Rezeptionen von Recht und Philosophie in 
Deutschland und Frankreich (Frankfurt, 2001), 329–378. 
80 Vause, “Disciplining the Market,” 653, 664, 671. 
	   26	  
nevertheless present in the few deliberations on the subject: attachment of individuals 
was only known in a “few” remaining cantons, wrote a legal author in 1858, who then, 
paradoxically, went on to name a number of industrial centers in addition to Zurich: 
Basel, Vaud, Geneva, Berne, as well as Neuchâtel and Valais. 81 In that sense, although 
incarceration existed, it led to very few conflicts with the legitimizing repertoire of the 
liberal imagination. This was due at least in part to the fact that there was not a consistent 
model of incarceration in Switzerland. In the mercantile urban canton of Geneva, for 
example, only merchants who had tried to shirk their financial liabilities were 
incarcerated (mirroring French laws).82 In the protoindustrial and industrial canton of 
Zurich, on the other hand, incarceration for debt evolved from an instance for evaluation 
to a means of coercion employed against the fully destitute.83 In such cases, taking 
possession of the body, which represented the goods of a person, was typically meant as a 
further type of substitution, namely, the enforcement of payment in installments. 
Theoretically creditors did not consider themselves compensated by the incarceration of 
their debtors, but the imprisoned body was seen as a stand-in for the debtor’s property. 
Also, imprisonment was not considered a punishment, but a temporary means of 
execution. In the eighteenth century, incarceration for debt was meant as a “scare tactic” 
(“Schreckmittel,” as contemporaries called it) to discipline and hold obstinate debtors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Fr. von Wyß, “Die Schuldbetreibung nach schweizerischen Rechten,” Zeitschrift für schweizerisches 
Recht 7 (1858): 113. A comparative legal study emphasized in 1870: “Il est evident qu’en Suisse comme 
partout la contrainte par corps aura bientôt fait son temps.” Alphonse Rivier: “De la contrainte par corps en 
Suisse,” in Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 2 (1870): 52. 
82 On the decades-long debate in France about who should be considered “commerçant” see, Erika Vause, 
“In the Red and in the Black: Bankruptcy, Debt Imprisonment, and the Culture of Credit in Post-
Revolutionary France” (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 2012); Erika Vause, “Disciplining the Market: Debt 
Imprisonment, Public Credit, and the Construction of Commerical Personhood in Revolutionary France,” 
Law and History Review 32, no. 3 (August 2014): 647–682. 
83 In some respects this mirrors the development in England, as shown by Margot Finn, where 
imprisonment for debt increasingly became a coercive means against working-class debtors. Finn, 
Character of Credit, 151, 154. 
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until their financial situation could be determined and their property inventoried.84 If the 
debtors declared bankruptcy, they were released. Around 1800, however, this changed.85 
Incarcerated debtors were increasingly those who were determined to be completely 
destitute and to possess nothing of value. Incarceration was used more and more often to 
exert pressure on the debtor. In this way, the threat of incarceration was present in the 
liberal era. The scant statistics available show that the number of arrest warrants rose 
during the crisis in the 1860s, even if, after 1851, such warrants could be issued only at a 
judge’s discretion, meaning that creditors could no longer expect to have a warrant 
automatically issued if they demanded it. 86 In Zurich and Geneva alike, the number of 
incarcerations was consistently lower than the number of warrants issued, and imprisoned 
debtors were typically released within a few days.87 Debtors made up only a small 
fragment of the prison population and were incarcerated locally.88 Of the median 858 
warrants issued annually in the years 1860–1868 in Zurich, for example, only a small 
fraction resulted in imprisonment and the number of warrants is dwarfed by the median 
almost 140’000 first dunning letters officially issued every year. Comparing the number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Satz- und Ordnungen eine frey-loblichen Statt-Gerichts zu Zurich, vol. 3, “Wie die Schuldner zu suchen 
und was Gewalt das Gericht haben solle?” (Zurich, 1715), 27, § 19; Gottfried von Meiss, Das Pfand-Recht 
und der Pfand- oder Betreibungs-Proceß in seinem ganzen Umfang: Nach den Gesetzen und der Uebung 
des Eidgen. Cantons Zürich / Ein civilrechtlicher Versuch (Zurich, 1821), 120. 
85 At first this was a matter of customary law, and in 1812 it was codified in a decree of the Council of 
States. Compare: “Circulare des Kleinen Raths vom 28sten Januar 1812, an sämmtliche Bezirks- und 
Unerstatthalter und die Bezirksgerichte, betreffend die Behandlung des Rechtstriebs für laufende Schulden, 
vorzüglich der Pfändung, und die Ertheilung und Anwendung des Wortzeichens,” in Officielle Sammlung 
der von dem Großen Rathe des Cantons Zurich gegebenen Gesetze und gemachten Verordnungen, und der 
von dem Kleinen Rath emanierten allgemeinen Landes- und Polizey-Verordnungen, vol. 5 (Zurich, 1813), 
248–252. Erich Appenzeller, Der Schuldverhaft und seine Abschaffung nach den Gesetzgebungen der 
schweizerischen Kantone und des Bundes (Langensalza, 1923), 15; Eduard Berdecki, Die Einflüsse der 
Aufklärung auf die Schuldhaft in den deutschen Staaten und in der Schweiz (Basel, 1959), 58. 
86 The analysis was done with data from 1860–1868, the last full year before the constitutional revisions of 
1869 abolished the incarceration. See Rechenschaftsberichte des Obergerichtes 1860–1868. 
87 On the length of incarceration in Geneva, see P.F. Bellot, Loi sur la procédure civile du Canton de 
Genève, suivie de l'Exposé des motifs, 2nd ed., seule compl. / par Schaub, Odier et Mallet (Paris, 1837), 
655f. 
88 STAZH P 296 Bezirksgefängnisse; STAZH P 300.1.2, Gefängniswesen, Bezirksgerichte. 
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of warrants with the number of debtors who were declared bankrupt – a median 268 for 
the same period –, however, provides evidence of the considerable impression left by 
such incarceration.89 It seems that incarceration was generally an incidental method to 
exert pressure on destitute debtors, and it was quietly abolished, first within the canton 
with the revision to the constitution in 1869, and then at the federal level in 1874.90 
Overall, from a method to pin down debtors and to scrutinize their property relations – 
that is, an investigative means – , imprisonment developed into a means of coercion to 
pressure debtors to mobilize their kinship ties, or other relations, to cover the debt.  
One of the few voices to criticize the knowledge practices related to debt 
imprisonment as inherently contradictory was that of the former mayor of Zurich, Conrad 
Melchior Hirzel, in a hearing which is preserved only in manuscript form and was 
probably never printed for distribution.91 In Hirzel’s view, incarceration did not lead to 
transparency and a reasoned access to the debtor’s property, but it did create great 
confusion and arouse uncontrolled passions. It was “obviously capricious” that warrants 
were routinely issued for debtors who had already declared themselves insolvent.92 As a 
temporary measure to detain a debtor while an inventory of his property could be taken, 
incarceration was a defensible measure. However, as soon as bankruptcy had been 
officially established, the debtor should be released. Anything else threatened to “destroy 
the consistency and the stability of different parts of our laws,” according to Hirzel.93 
Detention of those absolutely unable to pay their debts served no purpose. Moreover, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See Rechenschaftsberichte des Obergerichtes 1860–1868; Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, ed., Historische 
Statistik der Schweiz. 
90 Rivier, “contrainte par corps”, 47. 
91 C[onrad] M[elchior] Hirzel, “Dissertation über das Wortzeichen,” (undated manuscript, prior to 1842), P 
37, STAZH. 
92 Ibid., part 1, p. 6.  
93 Ibid., part 1, p. 9. 
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authority of official knowledge, which vouched for the procedures of a declaration of 
bankruptcy, were undermined by the incarceration. 
Instead of fairly distributing the assets to be liquidated among all the creditors 
according to established rules, incarceration threatened to become a campaign by one 
single “revengeful creditor” seeking to throw the “black fortune of an anxious, fleeting, 
outlawed life” over his debtor.94 Instead of being a legal measure, incarceration of the 
debtor took place outside of the law. And instead of being a systematic instrument, 
imprisonment fueled uncontrolled affects. The public should view creditors who sought 
to use this method as “hardhearted and zealous.”95 On the other hand, hypothesized 
Hirzel, when faced with prison, the debtor was prepared to “take the most desperate of 
measures” in order to “hold off the rolling wheel of his fortune.” This encouraged secret 
negotiations between debtors and unscrupulous creditors and gave dishonesty the upper 
hand over honesty. In fact, legal means would thereby become an “object for sale, which 
might be put on the market [...].”96 Unlike the methodical attachment of property, in 
Hirzel’s opinion imprisonment for debt created new intransparencies. Hirzel’s concern 
was not characterized by universal, abstract views of freedom and property. Again, for an 
extensive investigation into a debtor’s financial situation, Hirzel approved of detention. 
The problem was not a fundamental incommensurability between body and collateral. In 
fact, Hirzel highlighted what the balancing of body and collateral entailed: instead of 
clarity, new confusion, and instead of predictability, an increased zeal which ran the 
knowledge practices of the bankruptcy process into the ground. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid., part 2, p. 23. 
95 Ibid., part 2, p. 10. 
96 Ibid., part 2, pp. 11, 8. 
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If the body represented collateral, which in mid-century was increasing 
repossessed, the body was not simply an equivalent of money, but rather its incarceration 
was an impetus for a new settlement, incremental repayment. In this respect the problem, 
as recognized by the few Swiss critics of the practice of debtor incarceration, was not so 
much a fundamental incommensurability between body and collateral, but rather that the 
collateralization of the body created new incalculability because the incarceration 
undermined the established knowledge practices associated with bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
Contouring the Unattachable Minimum 
Parallel to the attachment of objects, human bodies, animals, titles, and 
entitlements, legal practices shaped the limits of the “unattachable.” One legal thinker 
suggested a “right of necessity” which should stipulate that a set of indispensable objects 
to be left to the debtor. In both the Elements of the Philosophy of Right and in his lectures 
concerning legal philosophy, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel referred to the so-called 
benefit of competence, meaning that a craftsman “was left the tools of his trade, and a 
farmer his field,” and that these were excluded from attachment.97 The right of necessity 
was accordingly employed “not only in extreme cases,” but rather in everyday contexts.98 
For Hegel, these unseizable objects represented a baseline, necessary in order to 
participate in the legal sphere at all, “for the alternatives are an infinite injury 
[Verletzung] to existence with total loss of rights, and an injury only to an individual and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, “Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer 
Nachschrift,” ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt, 1983), 100. As an introduction: Wolfgang Schild, “Hegels 
Lehre vom Notrecht,” in Vittorio Hösle, ed., Die Rechtsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus (Hamburg, 
1989). 
98 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen: ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, vol. 14, 
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Angehrn, Martin Bondeli, and Hoo Nam Seelmann (Hamburg, 2000), 61. 
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limited existence of freedom, whereby right as such and the capacity for rights of the 
injured party, who has been injured only in this specific property, continues to be 
recognized.”99 The right of necessity did not come from a sphere far-removed from the 
law, but was rather situated in the positive law. Nevertheless, the right of necessity 
provoked a “collision” or irresolvable situation, for the property rights of the creditor 
continued to exist even though the right of necessity meant that they were temporarily 
suspended.100 The right to property and the right of subsistence were neither completely 
incommensurable nor definitively ranked: the liberal legal theoretician Carl von Rotteck 
viewed the right of necessity as a “contradiction of truths,” which risked that “logic might 
no longer have a place in legal doctrine.”101 
The Swiss legal system lacked such intricate legal reasoning, but it, too, 
recognized the benefit of competence in which an object-based conception of property 
corresponded to knowledge practices. Until the implementation of the federal law in 
1892, the category of the “indispensable” remained narrow and material. The minimum 
was quasi sequestrated in things, so to speak. This constellation benefited the division of 
subject and object in liberalism,102 for it provided for clearly defined material values 
instead of suspiciously inconsistent, potentially insatiable “needs.” In the canton of 
Zurich in the 1830s, such exclusions applied to a family’s hymnals, to the children’s 
schoolbooks, the clothing of the wife and children, and to the “indispensable” clothing of 	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the debtor himself, as well as objects that had been acquired from an institution (military, 
poor relief, or the fire department). In 1842, gifts to the children from their godparents 
were added to this list, as were, in mid-century, implements for cooking and bedding—
which initially included blankets and pillows and later bedsteads and mattresses. 
Inconsistencies persisted in the regulations of tools and objects integral to the family’s 
livelihood (dung, but also cooking utensils). The set of indispensables had originally 
included those things via which the household was linked to the community at large. In 
the late nineteenth century, legal thought understood these unattachable objects to be 
covered by public law or “common welfare.”103 The federal law of 1892 expanded the 
category of “indispensables” considerably. It incorporated the rules of French-speaking 
Switzerland, which had been in turn influenced by the more comprehensive stipulations 
of French law, and the German civil procedure code of 1877.104 The debate over who 
should control household objects at the end of the nineteenth century came at a moment 
in which institutional bodies were rapidly expanding to deal with the problems they 
perceived in an urbanizing, industrializing society. Under the auspices of the nascent 
welfare state, public administration, bodies of scientific expertise, commercial and 
philanthropic organizations, and the labor movement ushered in new forms of knowing. 
At the same time, these institutions attempted to standardize social practices within the 
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fabric of the national state.105 Although they were controversial from the very beginning, 
statistics provided the central measurement in this discussion over the objectification of 
the “social question.”106 A popular legal periodical postulated that the federal law, by 
expanding the category of indispensable household objects, was, with regards to the 
social question, “more important than all the laws regulating liability, accident insurance, 
and alcohol together.”107 The “politics of the necessary” were thus renegotiated and the 
minimum became a key social category.108 
Some commentators argued that consumers’ creditworthiness would be eroded if 
wages and household assets could be attached only in part.109 Construction workers relied 
on credit in the winter months, and without the guarantee of their future wages, 
shopkeepers would give them no credit.110 Other observers saw this as a welcome 
disciplinary measure that would force working-class consumers to pay more frequently in 
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cash.111 A legal journal pointed out that in the first years after the introduction of the 
federal law, the officials had been reluctant to attach wages due to the lack of precedent. 
Objects excluded from attachment were easier to measure than monetary wages.112 The 
legal regulations of indispensable objects were supposed to discipline, mold, and assess 
debtors. The suspicion remained that, given the number of indispensable, unattachable 
objects, it would no longer be possible to collect smaller sums.113 In the first months after 
the law was introduced, satirical newspaper articles circulated about cunning debtors 
who, faced with imminent attachment, transferred all their assets into objects that were 
excluded from such seizure.114 According to the federal law, the objects that had been 
declared indispensable could not be replaced with a respective monetary value. A 
workers’ organization demanded to no avail that craftsmen should be allowed to retain 
raw materials necessary for one month’s work and that the unemployed should have their 
payments deferred.115 A newspaper supportive of the state paid especial attention to 
insurance payments which were only partially attachable under the proposed law. It 
welcomed this as a method of encouraging individuals to “strive for financial 
security.”116 
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As historian Dana Simmons has argued, assessing basic minimal needs is 
essentially “a political act”, for it means “defining what is universal and law-like, and 
what is contingent”.117 The debate among experts, politicians, and businesspeople about 
the limitations of attachment dealt primarily with objects. A “low measured, middling 
lifestyle” was “fixed as the norm”, as a contemporary legal dissertation expressed it.118 
Wedding rings were never attachable, while pictures with Biblical motifs were, except for 
“actual pictures of saints”; the question as to whether a man’s coat belonged to the 
indispensables or not was answered in the affirmative in the case of a travelling 
merchant, but negatively in that of a rural man. Although pocket watches of factory 
workers were initially controversial, officials quickly declared them to be excluded from 
attachment; the same was true of sewing machines with which some female debtors 
worked on the side.119 A wardrobe or a chest of drawers, a washstand, a table, and one 
chair per person were to be left in the dwelling—and, in one case, a sofa which served as 
a child’s bed, as well.120 Legal institutions debated the question as to whether children 
should be expected to share a bed, but the majority supported this.121 The officials 
executing the seizure, however, could insist that an expensive bedstead be traded for a 
simpler one.122 The theory and practice were expressly meant not to ensure a lifestyle 
befitting a person’s status but rather to balance the standard for a “recognized level in 	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need of protection.”123 Here, too, one can speak of a process of normalization qua 
objects. This normalization, however, was thwarted time and again. One reason for that is 
the extent to which objects became charged with great meaning. The objects exempt from 
seizure seemed to be connected to the personhood of the individual in default. The 
relationship of the person to property was seen in liberalism as a connection worthy of 
significant protection. Attachment was necessary to guarantee the property rights of 
creditors. All the same, the seizure of property, as was involved in attachment, was a 
tricky proposition for the legal imagination. Here objects provided a means for a 
taxonomical method of assessing worth and needs, as the indispensable objects exempt 
from seizure were projected on a generalized level of basic needs. 
 
Conclusion 
It is “necessary to allow for the modern notion that debt enforcement is an act 
against property and not an act against the personhood” of the individual involved, 
observed Alfred Brüstlein in 1893, one of the authors of Switzerland’s Federal Statute on 
Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy, which had been implemented the previous year.124 In 
the nineteenth century, the problem of how to distinguish “actions against property” from 
those “against personhood,” as the legal expert Brüstlein deemed appropriate, proved to 
be intractable. Within these ongoing difficulties, the conditions for economic exchange 
appeared increasingly charged in the 1880s. An increased criticism of debt relationships 
came at a moment in which the expansion of administration, science, philanthropy, and 
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the labor movement had made the social an object of observation and intervention.125 In 
this context, as has been argued here, the material relationship of debts for which 
liberalism established legal regulations became significant. In regards to collateralization, 
the “federal statute on debt enforcement and bankruptcy” of 1892 marked a compression 
of the relationships between persons and things that helped to stabilize debt relationships. 
In conclusion, I would thus like to venture a conceptual generalization while discussing 
the changing shapes of the collateralization’s knowledge practices. 
The collateralization of objects required a robust technical legal routine, which 
promoted the compartmentalization of knowledge. The relationality of debts was 
corralled by rudimentary methods of notation and was transferred to attached objects. 
Collateralization was primarily a moment of closure. Unlike complicated bankruptcy 
proceedings, the seizure of objects allowed for an inconspicuous administrative process 
and avoided a certain problematic of knowledge. Collateralization thus lay along a 
trajectory with a conceptual division of subject and object which had paved the way for 
liberalism, and which was meant to facilitate the free circulation of money, objects, 
information, and people. In the eyes of bourgeois philanthropists, the practice of 
pawnbroking provoked liminal relationships between persons and objects in which the 
disentanglement of exchange value and use value failed. The form of knowledge, 
however, which was key in the incarceration of debtors, was investigative. In the face of a 
mobile economy, it seemed thus permissible to take control of the debtor’s body while an 	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inventory of the debtor’s property was compiled. In addition, in the first two-thirds of the 
nineteenth century, incarceration served in a mediating capacity for a system of 
repayment via installments that could be negotiated and enforced via debtors’ prison. 
Financial debts could be transformed under the pressure of incarceration, and the 
settlement of accounts taking place in this manner garnered little notice because it was 
increasingly the lower classes which felt its brunt. 
The category of indispensables the household of the debtor retained was based on 
an increasingly taxonomic form of knowledge. Here, too, the bypassing of a problematic 
of knowledge became apparent when objects were employed to define the limits of 
collateral. The federal statute of 1892 extended these limits in a time when the concept of 
the “minimum” was becoming central in public debate. The indispensable household 
utensils were used more and more to define a generalized standard. Within this process, 
the appeal of materiality in liberal legal thought is evident, for this “minimum” was 
outlined not in monetary terms but rather in material terms. In that sense, it related claims 
of entitlement to a minimum of things. 
The ongoing significance of compartmentalized knowledge, a partial shift from 
investigative to taxonomic knowledge, a steady unease with liminal relations: viewed 
together, these knowledge practices reveal new insight into liberal authority. Further, they 
highlight a facet of force in liberalism that has been seldom addressed. Collateralization 
via attachment was not a distant, abstract act of state, but rather a concrete, tangible 
instance in which force was employed to protect that which was perceived to be natural 
circulation within the credit market. The supposedly free circulation was underpinned by 
the efforts of an intrusive state. 
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Thus the methods of collateralization can be viewed as a double movement: as an 
untangling of social relationships which nevertheless created new, unpredictable 
complications. Although collateralization was seen to reduce complexity, new 
entanglements entered through the back door. Each of the knowledge practices involved 
in the method of collateralization brought with it certain epistemic concerns: the sale and 
circulation of mortgages on real estate undermined the distinction of movable and fixed 
property; the legal attachment of goods failed due to the intertwined modalities of 
payment in the early phases of industrialization; collateralization aimed to recoup the 
monetary value of the goods attached, but denied the debtor of a much greater value, 
namely the value of the goods in their everyday use; in the eyes of its critics, 
incarceration of debtors did not facilitate rational access to their property, but it did 
unleash uncontrolled passions; and, finally, the economic conversion intrinsic in 
pawnbroking seemed to be inextricably tied up with moral quandaries. 
This essay set out to show that collateralization sought to transform the 
relationship which debt created between an object and a person. Furthermore, the process 
of abstraction as well as the particularization by the method of collateralization 
transformed the object itself. This allows for a methodological conclusion. Instead of 
starting with an assumed a priori “intrinsic logic” of things, this essay examined how the 
angle of perception and the transaction that framed an object interacted; the aim thereby 
was to locate the source of this “intrinsic logic.” It was due to the institutions and 
processes of mediation rather than mechanical determinism that objects employed as 
collateral could facilitate stability in the day-to-day economy under liberalism even as 
this process constantly created new confusion. 
